Organization theorists have recently adopted the human trait of ambidexterity, or the ability of individuals to use both their hands with equal skill, as a metaphor to describe organizations. As defined, ambidextrous firms are capable of exploiting existing competencies as well as exploring new opportunities with equal dexterity. However, because exploitative and exploratory orientations emerge from contradictory knowledge-processing capabilities (Floyd & Lane, 2000) , researchers debate how, or even if, firms can achieve both orientations and whether such a pursuit results in higher performance.
Those researchers who view ambidexterity as an attainable outcome have highlighted the structures (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996; 1997) , meta-routines (Adler, Goldoftas, & Levine, 1999) , and behavioral contexts (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004) that promote it, as well as the integrative role of the top management team (TMT) in helping to create such mechanisms (Smith & Tushman, 2005) . For example, Tushman and O'Reilly suggested that ambidexterity is largely driven by TMTs' "internal processes that enable them to handle large amounts of information and decision alternatives and deal with conflict and ambiguity" (1997: 23), but they did not specify the precise nature of these TMT processes.
To gain a better understanding of the underlying processes, we focus on the pivotal role of "behavioral integration," an all-inclusive TMT process construct that Hambrick (1994) considered a major refinement to upper echelon theory. Intended to capture the level of the senior team's wholeness and unity of effort, a behaviorally integrated TMT is better able to synchronize the team's social and task processes, including the quality of information exchange, collaborative behavior, and joint decision making (Hambrick, 1994; Simsek, Veiga, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2005) . Our thesis is that a TMT's level of behavioral integration directly influences how its members deal with the contradictory knowledge processes that underpin the attainment of an exploitative and exploratory orientation, such that greater integration enhances the likelihood of jointly pursuing both.
To test this thesis, we chose small-to medium-sized firms (SMEs) as a sampling frame because firms of this size (i.e., employing 20 to 500 individuals) and age (considerably older than start-ups) present a more direct litmus test of this link. We infer this because SMEs, like larger firms, generally face the kind of competitive pressures to jointly pursue exploitation and exploration. However, SMEs lack the amount of slack resources and the kind of hierarchical administrative systems that can help or impede larger firms in managing their contradictory knowledge processes and, thus, affect the attainment of ambidexterity. For example, larger firms can manage these processes by creating structurally separate business units, some focusing entirely on exploitation and others entirely on exploration.
Lacking these facilitating mechanisms, we argue, SMEs have to rely more on the ability of their TMT to attain ambidexterity. In particular, because SMEs have fewer hierarchical levels, their top managers are more likely to play both strategic and operational roles and, therefore, they directly experience the added dissonance of competing knowledge demands inherent in the pursuit of an ambidextrous orientation. Thus, to the extent that ambidexterity is largely facilitated by the senior management team's internal processes, as suggested by Tushman and O'Reilly (1997) , we reason that the level of TMTs' behavioral integration in SMEs is pivotal in effectively coping with, and integrating, these disparate demands.
In addition, whereas some scholars argue that firm performance is enhanced when firms engage in "sufficient exploitation and enough exploration" (Levinthal & March 1993) , and others find some support for this claim using cross-sectional data (Gibson & Birkinshaw 2004; He & Wong, 2004) , still others question the robustness of this claim. For example, March (1991) asserted that given the inherent difficulties of attaining and maintaining a proper balance between exploration and exploitation, firms might run the risk of being mediocre at both. Indeed, pursuing this point of view, some suggest that firms should primarily concentrate their resources, management routines, and knowledge flows in only one direction, allowing for only marginal consideration of the other direction (Barney, 1991; Ghemawat & Costa, 1993; Porter, 1985) . Therefore, we theoretically examine whether an SME's joint pursuit of exploration and exploitation enhances its performance and then empirically test this association using subsequent relative performance data gathered 1 year later.
Finally, we recognize that aside from theoretical justifications for studying SMEs, there is also an important practical reason. SMEs represent a vital component of most nations' economies. In the United States alone, SMEs are, by far, the most common form of business organization, generating about 70% of all jobs in the country (Small Business Association, 2003 ). Yet, despite their ubiquity, SMEs tend to be overlooked by management scholars, generally because data about them are not readily available. Instead, the extant literature on TMT processes and ambidexterity has tended to focus on larger firms, ones that typically compete with multiple businesses in multiple markets, leaving a gap in our understanding. To begin to fill this gap, we test our hypotheses using multisource survey data from 139 SMEs, which were gathered from their CEOs and 369 of their TMT members. In so doing, we provide an upper echelon explanation of SME-level ambidexterity and performance.
Exploitation and Exploration
Researchers have either implicitly or explicitly noted that exploitation and exploration entail contradictory knowledge processes (Floyd & Lane, 2000) . On one hand, exploitation involves the use of explicit knowledge bases, such that by internalizing and combining them, incremental refinements to existing technological or marketing trajectories can be made (Nonaka, 1994) . In effect, the intent of exploitation is to respond to current environmental conditions by adapting existing technologies and further meeting the needs of existing customers (Harry & Schroeder, 2000) . In contrast, exploration involves the use of tacit knowledge bases, such that by externalizing and combining them, new technological or marketing trajectories are developed (Nonaka, 1994) . Essentially, exploration is intended to respond to, as well as drive, latent environmental trends by creating innovative technologies and new markets.
Fundamentally, these knowledge processes are contradictory because they tap different administrative routines and managerial behaviors. Exploitation primarily involves learning from a top-down process, in which senior managers move to institutionalize those routines and behaviors that are best suited for refining current competencies. In contrast, exploration generally involves a bottom-up learning process, in which senior managers are persuaded to abandon their old routines and make a commitment to a new course of action (Wooldridge & Floyd, 1989) . Unlike exploitation, exploration necessitates developing new skills and internal 648 Journal of Management / October 2006 selection processes that are expected to yield a sufficient variety of autonomous strategic initiatives, that is, experiments with new skills or market opportunities that are triggered by shifts in factor or product markets (Burgelman, 1991) . And, whereas exploitation entails largely formalized interactions between levels of management, exploration entails intensely sociopolitical interactions that, because they are influenced by where managers reside in the organization's hierarchy, may cause managers to perceive the need to adapt differently (Weick, 1995) .
Although SMEs face similar knowledge-processing demands as do their larger counterparts, SMEs differ significantly in the impediments that they face in dealing with these processes. For example, because they are closest to the changing trends in customer demand, the operating managers at both firm types are generally the first to feel the need to explore new sources of competitive advantage. At large firms, however, the operating managers typically communicate their insights and recommended initiatives to middle managers, who, in turn, choose what to convey, if anything, to senior managers. In some instances, middle managers may feel conflicted, particularly if these initiatives entail changing routines, competencies, and resource allocations, which threaten the status quo (Floyd & Lane, 2000) . Consequently, middle managers may choose to filter or alter the meaning of cues from the operating-level managers to suit their own interpretation or to promote their own agenda. They may do so, even at the expense of their operating managers (Dutton & Jackson, 1987) , the firm's strategic selection process, and the firm's performance.
In contrast, such organizational impediments tend to be minimized in SMEs, simply because the members of their TMTs are much closer to the firm's operating core. Indeed, senior managers in SMEs not only ratify and direct their firm's strategy, as do their counterparts in larger firms, but they also participate more directly in the day-to-day implementation of those strategies, as do the operating managers in larger firms. Consequently, these managers are closer to the firm's existing competencies and, therefore, are knowledgeable about when and how to exploit them. They are also closer to the markets and, therefore, are positioned to be more aware of changing trends in customer demand. This enables them to potentially discover, evaluate, and champion new market opportunities more directly-activities that lie at the heart of exploration.
Such potential notwithstanding, however, the ability of senior managers in SMEs to guide knowledge processes in ways that promote an ambidextrous orientation is not a given. Indeed, studies of SMEs have shown these firms to be, on average, biased toward exploratory processes, such as the proactive acquisition of new information (Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000) , higher level learning (Busenitz & Barney, 1997) , product leadership (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990) , and the aggressive use of resources in new arenas (Romanelli, 1987) . In other words, despite facing fewer organizational learning impediments, senior managers in SMEs will experience dissonance in trying to reconcile contradictory knowledge demands, particularly because they are often expected to play both operating and strategic roles.
To illustrate, consider a senior operations manager who has invested a considerable amount of time and energy researching a new process technology that could improve the production efficiency of the firm's current product line. Although operationally this new technology could be important, as a member of the firm's TMT, this manager knows that the team may not support it for strategic reasons. In particular, the team has begun to converge on a plan to invest in a new product line that is unlikely to benefit from the new process technology but better meets the market's changing needs. Thus, the dilemma is, Should the operations manager pursue his or her operating agenda by championing the new technology, or should he or she pursue the team's strategic agenda and remain silent about the technology? We reason that reconciling this dissonance places a premium on the kind of TMT processes that encourage the sharing of valuable insights, along with a platform for reconciling contradictory role demands. As such, we posit that the ability to jointly pursue exploitation and exploration in SMEs is directly rooted in the extent to which their TMTs are behaviorally integrated.
Theory and Hypotheses
As a starting point to ground this argument, we turn to the team process research, which integrates the upper echelon view of the firm (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) with group process theory (Shaw, 1981) and examines how TMT processes work to influence team and/or firm outcomes such as strategies and performance. Previous studies in this line of inquiry have examined various team process constructs, including communication quality (O'Reilly, Snyder, & Boothe, 1993) , communication frequency (Smith, Smith, Olian, Sims, O'Bannon, & Scully, 1994) , speed in decision-making processes (Eisenhardt, 1989) , debate (Simons, Pelled, & Smith, 1999) , decision comprehensiveness (Simons et al., 1999) , social integration (Smith et al., 1994) , and interpersonal conflict and agreement seeking (Knight et al., 1999) . Knight et al. (1999) succinctly captured the essence of this research stream when they noted that the central arguments behind these studies pertain to team processes that either provide greater efficiency (e.g., reducing costs or increasing speed in decision making) or greater effectiveness (e.g., making better decisions).
This research has moved the field closer to understanding some of the complexities of the TMT process. However, Hambrick (1994) reasoned that there is more to reveal because TMT processes are distinct from group processes at other levels in the organization, in part because TMT members face higher levels of firm-related task responsibilities, individually as senior executives and interdependently as members of a firm's top decision-making team. Therefore, he parsimoniously recast specific social and task team processes into the allencompassing metaconstruct of behavioral integration, consisting of one social dimension (the level of the team's collaborative behavior) and two task dimensions (the team's quantity and quality of information exchanged and its emphasis on joint decision making). He argued that these mutually reinforcing processes, when taken in concert, better capture a TMT's level of wholeness and unity of effort than does each dimension when examined separately. For example, because "fragmented teams" are victims of minimal interaction and impoverished decision making (Hambrick, 1995) but may also display high degrees of cohesion (Janis, 1972) , failure to examine all aspects of the team's process could result in misspecifying the team's level of behavioral integration.
Recent research has advanced behavioral integration's authenticity by developing a reliable measure of it and confirming its multilevel origin (Simsek et al., 2005) . In addition, there has also been work on behavioral integration's consequences. For example, Hambrick (1995) noted that firms that have difficulty adapting to external challenges in a timely manner 650 Journal of Management / October 2006 have the least integrated TMTs. Siegel and Hambrick (1996) argued that behaviorally integrated teams make better use of knowledge alternatives because cognitive conflict in such teams affords them more opportunities to debate and discuss strategic issues. Similarly, Hambrick (1998) concluded that behavioral integration enables the TMT to combine knowledge and insights to respond well to the increasing needs of the market, to create core competencies, and to develop global strategies. Li and Zhang (2002) found that behavioral integration facilitated product innovation intensity, and Carmeli and Schaubroeck (in press) found that it improved the quality of TMT decisions. In sum, this stream of work further substantiates Hambrick's assertion that truly integrated teams engage in several interrelated processes, reflecting the inherent complexity and dynamism of strategic decision making that cannot be adequately captured by any single process dimension.
Behavioral Integration and SME Ambidexterity
Building on this stream of work, we posit that behaviorally integrated TMTs in SMEs are better able to manage the contradictory knowledge processes, which are required to attain an ambidextrous orientation. That is, by synchronizing the social and task processes associated with collaborative behavior, quality of information exchange, and joint decision making, a behaviorally integrated TMT can promote a more diverse and deeper understanding of the team's existing explicit knowledge base, as well as a better use of that base. In effect, such synchronization increases the "opportunity for feedback and error correction and . . . synthesis of different points of view" (Tushman & Nadler, 1978: 618) . Said differently, the extent to which a TMT is behaviorally integrated is positively associated with an SME's ability to adapt to current environmental challenges, by revealing ways to further refine the firm's existing technological and marketing trajectories to the senior executives.
Similarly, by promoting a collaborative, high-quality exchange of information, behavioral integration engenders social mechanisms such as trust and reciprocity (Coleman, 1990; Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997) , which should further serve to dissipate a team member's reluctance to sharing tacit knowledge, critical to exploration. Therefore, behaviorally integrated TMTs should be better able to draw from a diverse set of insights from their senior executives-each a repository of tacit knowledge based on frequent interactions at the operating level with the external market and internal organizational environment. Such divergent knowledge sharing promotes the TMT's externalizing and combining of its tacit knowledge base and, therefore, the discovery of new opportunities. Or, as Hambrick (1998) observed, behavioral integration enables the TMT to combine knowledge in ways that can create new insights and competencies regarding the firm's strategic options.
Conversely, absent behavioral integration and the associated interaction and collaboration, team members are more likely to resolve any dissonance they face by focusing "on their own piece of the enterprise" (Hambrick, 1998: 123) . At this extreme, TMT coordination is more likely to be limited to bilateral exchanges coupled with infrequent and highly distilled communication (Hambrick, Li, Xin, & Tsui, 2001) . Consequently, less behaviorally integrated TMTs are more prone to divert their attention to team maintenance, as well as to require costly formal rules to function (Smith et al., 1994) , all of which detracts from the likelihood of developing an ambidextrous orientation in an SME.
Suppose, for example, a senior marketing manager in an SME envisions a new product innovation that could move the firm into an entirely new market. If this manager is part of a less behaviorally integrated TMT, he or she might naturally feel reluctant to champion the initiative because this individual expects that the team will be less receptive and supportive of ideas that might deviate from the status quo. If, however, this manager is part of a more behaviorally integrated TMT, he or she should be a more willing champion. We say that because, in a climate of collaboration, where a general predisposition also exists to freely exchange information and jointly make decisions, we expect that the TMT members will be more receptive to a broad range of initiatives. And, from an open discussion of existing and new market opportunities, coupled with a willingness to share explicit knowledge and tacit insights, such a team will be more apt to uncover ways to feasibly pursue new markets, while jointly expanding existing ones. In effect, this scenario reinforces Nonaka's (1994) argument that "although ideas are formed in the minds of individuals, interactions typically play a critical role in developing these ideas," and it is through this "community of interaction that new organizational knowledge is developed."
In sum, a behaviorally integrated TMT acts as a forum in which senior executives can openly and freely exchange contradictory knowledge, resolve conflicts, and create a set of shared perceptions that then can be integrated and acted upon, thereby facilitating the firm's development of a more ambidextrous orientation. Stated formally, Hypothesis 1: The level of behavioral integration of TMTs in SMEs is positively associated with the extent to which they pursue an ambidextrous orientation.
Ambidexterity and SME Performance
But, is an SME's ambidextrous orientation linked to its subsequent performance? Although a positive association is implicit in much of the grounding of our first hypothesis and in the recent literature (e.g., Gibson & Birkinshaw 2004; He & Wong, 2004) , this causal link has neither been theoretically clear nor empirically established. Indeed, some have previously argued that the pursuit of ambidexterity is no guarantee of subsequent performance (Barney, 1991; Ghemawat & Costa, 1993) , given the difficulties of attaining and maintaining a proper balance of exploration and exploitation (March, 1991) . We opt for the more recent view, basing our position on Floyd and Lane's assertion that in order for firms to remain adaptive and escape the forces of environmental selection, they must "exploit existing competencies and explore new ones-and more importantly, that these two facets of organizational learning are inseparable " (2000: 155) .
Consider SMEs that primarily pursue exploration and, therefore, are proficient at proactively responding to environmental changes by seeking revolutionary innovations. These firms may have positive performance outcomes, particularly should they discover a new competency that shapes the rules of the competitive game in ways that rivals will have difficulty imitating or if they are able to expand their customer base into new or emerging markets (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997) . However, such initiatives also entail some inherent risk because their benefits are difficult to estimate a priori and may take years to realize, if they do so at all. These risks can be particularly onerous for SMEs, which lack the resources to sustain such efforts for extended periods of time. Moreover, SMEs that are only deft in exploration incur significant costs both in terms of research and in the potential loss of sustained paybacks from earlier innovations, making them more vulnerable to efficiencyminded and larger competitors. Indeed, as Levinthal and March note, "An organization that engages exclusively in exploration will ordinarily suffer from the fact that it never gains the returns of its knowledge " (1993: 105) .
In contrast, consider SMEs that primarily pursue exploitation and, therefore, strive to make incremental refinements to existing technological or marketing trajectories intended to better adapt to current environmental conditions and to the needs of the firm's existing customers (Harry & Schroeder, 2000) . Although the returns to these firms may be more proximate and predictable than those who pursue exploration, their returns are not necessarily sustainable because they run the risk of obsolescence. Deftly pursuing exploitation can cause a firm to be effective at adapting to incremental trajectory changes, but the firm will be ineffective at adapting to major changes, including those introduced by their exploratory-driven rivals, echoing the sentiments of Levinthal and March who suggested that "an organization that engages exclusively in exploitation will ordinarily suffer from obsolescence " (1993: 105) .
Recognizing the adaptive limitations of each orientation and the indeterminate association each would seem to have with performance, scholars have long suggested, but have yet to conclusively show, that a firm's ability to compete is rooted in an ability to jointly pursue both orientations, that is, build on current competencies through exploitation, while developing new innovative capabilities through exploration, such that the pursuit of both positively affects the productive service of each (Abernathy, 1978) . Indeed, the ability to achieve such a level of ambidexterity is said to lie at the heart of a firm's dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) .
Accordingly, we reason that although an ambidextrous orientation does not assure subsequent SME performance, it is an essential core driver that should enhance returns for the firm relative to its competitors-as they are better able to attain and sustain their advantages in the marketplace and, thus, are more able to shield their future cash flows from external selection pressures. We also reason that the empirical linkage between ambidexterity and the firm's relative performance will be more evident at SMEs than at larger firms, given that determinants of performance at the latter are driven by a larger set of influences extraneous to TMT diversity, such as multiple products, markets, and divisions. Thus, Hypothesis 2: The extent to which SMEs pursue an ambidextrous orientation is positively associated with their subsequent relative performance.
Method

Sampling Strategy and Data
Using data from D&B's Million Dollar Database, we identified 795 small-to medium-sized firms (i.e., employing 20 to 500 individuals) in one region of New England to facilitate meeting each firm's CEO. Letters, endorsed by the director of the local Small Business Development Center, were sent to the CEOs of these firms. These letters explained the research project, encouraged participation, promised that each participating firm would receive an executive summary of the findings when the study was completed, and indicated that we would follow up by telephone. We then began contacting CEOs to request participation and, if they agreed, to schedule a meeting. One hundred ninety-three CEOs agreed. During the meeting, the nature of the study was further explained, and each CEO was given a survey to complete and return via a postage-paid envelope. Then, following prior studies (e.g., Smith, Collins, & Clark, 2005; Smith et al., 1994) , we asked these CEOs to identify all the members of their TMT and to send a memo encouraging each member to participate, along with a survey and postage-paid return envelope. After excluding incomplete surveys and surveys from firms that had less than a 50% TMT member response rate, we received usable responses from 154 firms' CEOs and 405 of their TMT members (or 19% of the original sampling frame of 795 firms).
In addition, we sent a follow-up survey to the 154 firms' CEOs 1 year after our first survey, to assess relative firm performance, and 90% responded, resulting in a final sample of 139 firms. We gathered these time-lagged performance data 1 year later for two reasons. First, on the basis of Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff's (2003) recommendation that the length of the time lag should correspond to the process under examination, we considered a 1-year lag to be sufficiently long enough to reflect, more fully, the performance impact of an ambidextrous orientation and sufficiently short enough to avoid the intervention of other contaminating factors and the loss of respondents. And, second, on the basis of Podsakoff and colleagues' recommendation for minimizing common method variance, we temporally separated our measures (i.e., a time lag in gathering data from the same source) by first gathering information on the predictor variables and then, subsequently, on the criterion variable.
The 139 SMEs in the final sample should not be confused with start-ups and other such entrepreneurial ventures, for these SMEs averaged 62 employees in size, $4.9 million in sales, and 24 years of age. And, their TMTs averaged 4.4 members (including the CEO), of which 16% are women. The average participation rate for TMT members was 83%, which compares favorably to most upper echelon studies in terms of sample size and TMT participation rates across firms (Geletkanycz, 1998; Hambrick, 1994) . Moreover, the data showed a high level of stability in the composition of the sampled TMTs, with an average TMT tenure of 9.5 years; 91.4% of the surveyed members have served at least 3 years with the team, and 92.1% of them have served at least 3 years with the firm.
Ninety percent of the firms were privately held. Based on the first two digits of the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), the firms primarily represented three industries, manufacturing (54%), scientific and technical services (19%), and construction (12%); the remaining firms were spread out over several different industries. A paired comparison test indicated no significant differences in firm age, size, or industry between firms that agreed to participate in our study and those that did not, and no significant differences in firm age and firm size across industries.
Measures
Behavioral integration. The survey asked the CEOs and each TMT member to assess their TMT's level of behavioral integration during the past 3 years. TMT behavioral integration was assessed using the nine-item measure and a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) that was developed and validated by Simsek and colleagues (2005) , whose sample was comparable to ours in firm size (22-500 employees) and TMT size (average of 4.75 members). They designed this measure to capture collaborative behavior, information exchange, and joint decision making, the three interrelated and mutually reinforcing TMT processes associated with Hambrick's meta-construct, and found the measure to have content, construct, and convergent validity.
Before aggregating the scores from each team member, including the CEO, we did a oneway analysis of variance on each item, using firm affiliation as the independent variable, to determine if there was greater variability in the ratings between organizations than within organizations (Winer, 1971) . The F ratio was significant (p < .001) for each item, supporting aggregation. We also used an interrater reliability coefficient developed by James, Demaree, and Wolf (1993) to examine the intragroup reliability (r wg ) of responses. It is suggested that an r wg greater than, or equal to, .70 is considered to be an indicator of good agreement within a group (George & Bettenhausen, 1990) . The average intragroup reliability of this scale was .81, further legitimizing the aggregation of individual team member scores. The overall measure of TMT behavioral integration had a reliability of α = .90, which compares favorably to α = .85 found by Simsek and colleagues (2005) .
We then compared two models using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). In the first model, behavioral integration was treated as a single factor with the nine items as separate indicators. In the second model, behavioral integration was a second-order construct represented by three related dimensions, which in turn were represented by three items, respectively. The analysis showed that the second-order model, χ between them is significant (p < .001). Our finding is consistent with Simsek and colleagues' findings (2005) and provides further evidence to support Hambrick's (1994) theory that behavioral integration's three dimensions are best captured as a meta-construct.
Ambidextrous orientation.
Although there is no widely accepted measure of an ambidextrous orientation, existing research provides a sound basis for developing one. For example, He and Wong (2004) designed a measure primarily based on product design differences having to do with exploration and exploitation. Benner and Tushman (2003) , however, conceptualized ambidexterity as encompassing more than just product design and proposed a two-dimensional definition, entailing exploration and exploitation differences along an innovation's proximity to the firm's current technological/product trajectory-which is similar to He and Wong's measure-and an innovation's proximity to the firm's existing customer/ market segment, which extended that measure. We, therefore, adapted, and then extended, He and Wong's (2004) 8-item measure into a 14-item measure, as a means to capture both of Benner and Tushman's (2003) proposed dimensions. Specifically, we developed seven items to reflect an exploratory orientation and seven items to reflect an exploitation orientation. To content validate these items, we initially asked a panel of 13 researchers familiar with the literature to independently categorize each item as consistent with an exploratory or exploitative orientation, or unknown. Out of the 14 items, 12 were consistently categorized, as expected, with an average agreement level of 90%, whereas 2 items (one exploratory and one exploitative) were inconsistently categorized and, therefore, dropped.
Consequently, the final measure consisted of 12 items in which respondents were asked to assess their firm's orientation during the past 3 years using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The six items consistent with an exploratory orientation described the firm as one that (a) looks for novel technological ideas by thinking "outside the box," (b) bases its success on its ability to explore new technologies, (c) creates products or services that are innovative to the firm, (d) looks for creative ways to satisfy its customers' needs, (e) aggressively ventures into new market segments, and (f) actively targets new customer groups. Similarly, the 6 items consistent with an exploitative orientation described the firm as one that (a) commits to improve quality and lower cost, (b) continuously improves the reliability of its products and services, (c) increases the levels of automation in its operations, (d) constantly surveys existing customers' satisfaction, (e) fine-tunes what it offers to keep its current customers satisfied, and (f) penetrates more deeply into its existing customer base.
A one-way analysis of variance (p < .001) and the intragroup reliability test (r wg = .79) suggest that the individual scores (including the CEO) for each item can be aggregated to the firm level. Based on firm-level data, a principal axis factor analysis using oblique rotation of the 12 items revealed the expected two-factor structure, which accounted for 66% of the variance. The two factors appropriately represented the exploration and exploitation items. Primary loadings exceeded .58, and cross-loadings were lower than .12. Adequate reliabilities were achieved for both exploration (α = .84) and exploitation (α = .83). These results suggest discriminant validity of the two measures.
Consistent with Floyd and Lane's (2000) assertion that these two orientations are "inseparable," researchers have combined both measures to create a measure of ambidexterity. For example, Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) measured ambidexterity by multiplying exploitation and exploration, whereas He and Wong (2004) subtracted exploitation from exploration and used an absolute difference score. As Edwards and Parry (1993) and Edwards (1993) pointed out, however, any time two or more measures are combined into a single index, enough information may be lost that the index cannot be accurately interpreted. That is, we need to know whether each component of the final index contributes uniquely to predicting outcomes or if only one component does so.
Following the procedures recommended by Edwards (1994) , we sought the most interpretable approach for combining our measures of exploration and exploitation. First, we ran an unconstrained regression equation in which firm performance was the dependent variable, and the orientations of exploration and exploitation were treated as separate independent variables. Then, we ran three constrained regression equations in which exploration and exploitation were combined into a single index, first by subtracting exploitation from exploration, second by multiplying exploration and exploitation, and third by summing the two. The "additive" model proved to be superior; its regression beta weight (.17) indicated no significant loss of information, whereas the beta weights for the "difference" and "multiplicative" models (.05 and .05, respectively) indicated significant loss of information relative to the unconstrained regression equation. Second, and again following Edward's (1994) procedures, we three-dimensionally plotted the relationship between firm performance, exploration, and exploitation. The result, as shown in Figure 1 , demonstrates that both orientations contribute uniquely to overall firm performance, further supporting the interpretability of an additive index.
Having established the interpretability of our measure, we then used CFA to compare three alternative additive models: Model 1 treats the two orientations as independent constructs, Model 2 treats them as latent factors of a second-order construct-ambidextrous orientation, and Model 3 treats all 12 items from the two measures as separate indicators of a single latent factor-ambidextrous orientation. Our data show that the best fit is Model 3, χ 2 (43, N = 139) = 66.81, p < .05, CFI = .97, IFI = .98, TLI = .96, AGFI = .90, and RMSEA = .06, which is superior to Model 1, χ 2 (50, N = 139) = 138.34, p < .001, CFI = .91, IFI = .91, TLI = .87, AGFI = .79, and RMSEA = .11, and Model 2, χ 2 (49, N = 139) = 94.20, p < .001, CFI = .95, IFI = .95, TLI = .93, AGFI = .87, and RMSEA = .08. Given these results, and those from Edwards's tests, we measured ambidextrous orientation as the sum of all 12 items (α = .89).
Relative firm performance. We gathered time-lagged performance data 1 year after surveying information on the predictor variables by asking CEOs (and not the other TMT Figure 1 Firm Performance, Exploratory, and Exploitative Orientation members) to compare their firm's performance relative to that of other major competitors on profitability and growth, using an eight-item scale developed by Gupta and Govindarajan (1986) , which was later used by researchers such as Covin, Prescott, and Slevin (1990) . The measure included items such as growth in sales, growth in market share, return on equity, and return on total assets, which were rated using a scale from 1 (much worse) to 5 (much better). The measure demonstrated good reliability (α = .91) and CFA suggested a good fit for all eight items, χ 2 (16, N = 139) = 34.72, p < .01, CFI = .98, IFI = .98, TLI = .97, AGFI = .91, and RMSEA = .09.
We used the CEOs' evaluation because objective data on the financial performance of SME firms are rarely available, largely because the owners are not legally required to publish these data. In addition, we did so because it is generally assumed that CEOs are knowledgeable informants, particularly with regard to their firms' performance. That said, and despite evidence to suggest that CEO self-reports of performance significantly correlate with some objective measures of firm performance (Dess & Robinson, 1984; Robinson & Pearce, 1988) , we decided to further test the veracity of our subjective measure. To do so, we obtained, from D&B's Million Dollar Database, an objective measure of sales growth (the only performance measure listed in this database) for 121 of our sample firms, computed over the same time frame as our subjective performance measure. To enhance comparability with the subjective scale, which is calibrated relative to competitors' performance, we adjusted the objective measure by the NAICS industry average sales growth rate, which was obtained from Standard & Poor's Market Insight Database. Finally, we correlated this objective industry-adjusted measure with our self-report of relative performance and found a positive and significant association (r = .24, p < .01). Hence, although this statistic is likely to be understated, because of the differences in which the two measures are scaled and computed, this finding provides evidence of the convergent validity of the self-report performance measure that we used.
Covariates. We included nine variables that have been associated with one or more of our study's core constructs. Regarding TMT processes, we controlled for team tenure by measuring the average tenure as reported by all team members and for team size by measuring the total number of individuals on a company's TMT, as reported by the CEO. Both team variables have been discussed in terms of their impact on TMT behavioral integration (Simsek et al., 2005) . Each was transformed by its square root because the distribution departed from normality.
Regarding firm-level variables, we controlled for firm size (the number of full-time employees), as it has been associated with inertia, difficulty in processing information related to changing resources, and failure to adapt to changing resource conditions (e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) . We also controlled for firm age (i.e., the number of years since the company was established), as it has been associated with the institutional routines and norms that engender inertial behaviors (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) . Both size and age were transformed by their square root because their distributions departed from normality. We also controlled for the firm's level of unabsorbed slack and past performance (1 year prior to our survey period), as both variables have been associated with exploration, exploitation, and firm performance. Unabsorbed slack was measured by a four-item measure, which combined Chattopadhyay, Glick, and Huber's (2001) two-item measure with Nohria and Gulati's (1996) two-item measure. The reliability for the combined four-item measure is α = .84. Past performance was evaluated by CEOs on the basis of the same scale used for subsequent firm performance (α = .95). Because SMEs are more likely to be "family firms" and, therefore, influenced by the founding family, we controlled for family ownership. Following Chua, Chrisman, and Sharma (1999) , we identified family firms on the basis of the percentage of the business owned by members of a family, the number of family members involved in managing the business, and whether the future successor as president of the business was expected to be a member of the family. Seventy-two sample firms met these family-firm criteria (coded as 1), and 67 firms did not (coded as 0).
And finally, with regard to environmental influences, we controlled for industry and environmental uncertainty because both have been linked to a firm's motivation to adapt to changing resource conditions and performance. On the basis of the first two digits of the NAICS code, the firms in our sample were categorized into four industries-manufacturing, scientific and technical services, construction, and others-and then were dummy coded. Environmental uncertainty was measured using a four-item scale reported by Waldman, Ramirez, House, and Puranam (2001) ; however, our reliability test resulted in two items being dropped in order to achieve an acceptable reliability (α = .75). The intragroup reliability (r wg ) is .79.
Analyses and Results
Beyond temporally separating measurement of our predictor variables and criterion variable, we also performed several post hoc tests including the Harman's single-factor test, CFAs, and bivariate correlations (Podsakoff et al., 2003) to look for additional traces of common method bias. Exploratory factor analysis, which combined items from the dependent variable and independent variables, provided initial evidence that no single factor attributable to common method bias was present in our data, which was further confirmed by scree plots. Further evidence of this was obtained using CFA in which a one-factor, a twofactor, and a three-factor model structure were compared to our measurement model, with the single-factor model producing the poorest fit. Our hypothesized model clearly outperformed other configurations in terms of discriminant validity as evidenced by significant chisquare reductions. Finally, to more directly rule out common method bias in our data, we also checked bivariate correlations and retested our hypotheses using the CEO's assessment of the firm's ambidextrous orientation versus all other team members' assessments of behavioral integration, and vice versa. The CEO's measures were significantly correlated with the assessment from all other TMT members (behavioral integration = .85; ambidextrous orientation = .82), and using these alternative assessments yielded results comparable to our full sample (details available upon request).
Because Simsek and colleagues (2005) found, consistent with Hambrick's (1994) conceptualization, that behavioral integration is best empirically represented as a second-order construct represented by three related dimensions, we used maximum likelihood structural equation modeling (SEM) to test our model's hypotheses. SEM was also appropriate because it allows estimation of multiple associations, it simultaneously incorporates observed and Lubatkin et al. / TMT Behavioral Integration 659 latent constructs in these associations, and it accounts for the biasing effects of random measurement error in the latent constructs (Medsker, Williams, & Holahan, 1994; Shook, Ketchen, Hult, & Kacmar, 2004) . We adopted the two-step approach to SEM outlined in Anderson and Gerbing (1988) , as recommended by numerous researchers including Hoyle and Panter (1995) and Medsker and colleagues (1994) . The first phase of this approach involves the fit of a CFA model to the observed data. The second phase involves comparing a sequence of nested structural models to yield information concerning the structural model that best accounts for the covariances observed between the model's exogenous and endogenous constructs (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988) . Below, we report results from both phases following suggestions in Hoyle and Panter (1995) , Medsker and colleagues (1994) , and Shook and colleagues (2004) and then report results for each individual hypothesis.
Phase 1: CFA Model Results
The first phase of Anderson and Gerbing's (1988) approach involves determining the fit of a CFA model to the observed data to assess the fit of the overall measurement model and then examining the psychometric properties of constructs. Each latent variable in SEM needs to be explicitly assigned a metric or a measurement range (Kline, 1998) . We did so by setting a path for each latent variable to 1.0. Factor loadings were also set equal to 1.0 for nonlatent variables.
Multiple indices were used to assess the fit of each model. The criteria examined included chi-square, a standardized measure where a smaller value represents a better fit, CFI, IFI, TLI, AGFI, and RMSEA (Hoyle & Panter, 1995; Medsker et al., 1994; Shook et al., 2004) . CFI, IFI, TLI, and AGFI have expected values of 1.0, and RMSEA has an expected value of .0 when the hypothesized model fully reflects the sample population. Although standards for such indices are difficult to establish, a value of .90 or higher for CFI, IFI, TLI, and AGFI, and a value of .08 or lower for RMSEA, is typically suggested as indicating adequate fit (Bollen, 1989; Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Hu & Bentler, 1999) . The fit indices for our measurement model were as follows: χ 2 (290, N = 139) = 399.41, p < .001, CFI = .96, IFI = .96, TLI = .94, AGFI = .90, and RMSEA = .05.
As Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black noted, once the overall CFA model has been accepted, "each of the constructs can be evaluated separately by: (1) examining the indicator loadings for statistical significance; and (2) assessing the construct's reliability and variance extracted" (1995: 652). Results for our CFA indicate that the relationship between each indicator variable and its respective variable is significant (p < .001), verifying the posited relationships among indicators and constructs, and thus, convergent validity (Hair et al., 1995: 653) .
For evidence of discriminant validity, we examined bivariate interitem correlations. Table 1 , which summarizes means, standard deviations, and correlations among all study variables, provides some initial evidence of discriminant validity and permits the interested reader to recover the covariance matrix that can be used to further assess our data. Specifically, given that no interfactor correlation is above the recommended level of .65 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996: 86) , multicollinearity and, hence, problems created by a lack of discriminant validity are not likely to bias our data. a. Behavioral integration is treated as a lower order, single dimensional construct in this table so as to compute its correlation with the other variables. † p < .10 *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
Phase 2: Sequence of Nested Structural Models Results
The second phase of Anderson and Gerbing's (1988) approach involves contrasts between sequences of nested structural models to yield information concerning a better fitting structural model that better accounts for the observed covariances among the latent constructs. The first contrast is between the measurement model and a null latent model that constrains the relationship between all latent factors to zero. A significant chi-square difference between the fit of the two models indicates that sufficient covariance exists between the latent variables to warrant testing the hypothesized model. The initial comparison between the measurement model, χ 2 (290, N = 139) = 399.41, p < .001, CFI = .96, IFI = .96, TLI = .94, AGFI = .90, and RMSEA = .05, and the null latent model, χ 2 (293, N = 139) = 437.68, p < .001, CFI = .94, IFI = .95, TLI = .92, AGFI = .88, and RMSEA = .06, evidenced a large significant (p < .001) chi-square difference (3) of 35.27. The result of the null latent model is summarized in Table 2 , Model 1.
This difference, then, provides the basis for examining the nested structural models in which the relative fit of the hypothesized model is assessed against other nested models (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988) . To gain a more complete understanding of our individual hypotheses, we tested another four nested structural models. In evaluating these models, we followed the suggestions of Jöreskog (1993) and Bollen (1989) , using a three-step procedure that includes assessments of (a) model fit using various fit indices, (b) significance of the completely standardized path estimates as a test of the model's hypotheses, and (c) amount of variance explained in the endogenous constructs as an indication of the substantive contribution of practical significance.
The covariates model specified the influences of all team-, firm-, and environment-level covariates on the model's two endogenous constructs, ambidextrous orientation and firm performance. As shown in Table 2 , Model 2, these covariates accounted for 13% of variance in the firm's ambidextrous orientation and 11% of the variance in firm performance, supporting our contention for their inclusion in the model. The next model (Model 3) specified the effect of ambidexterity on firm performance after accounting for the effects of covariates. Supporting Hypothesis 2, ambidexterity was positively associated with performance (.27, p < .01) and explained additional significant variance in performance (∆R 2 = .06). Model 4 added the effect of behavioral integration on the firm's ambidextrous orientation. Supporting Hypothesis 1, behavioral integration was associated with ambidextrous orientation (.45, p < .001) and explained additional variance (∆R 2 = .17). In Model 5, the path from behavioral integration to firm performance, although not hypothesized, was added to fully test all plausible relationships. As shown, this model, χ These findings suggest that the more parsimonious model that we hypothesized (Model 4) better fits the data. The significant standardized path estimates for the two paths in this model (as shown in Figure 2 ) suggested that our two hypotheses were both supported: Behavioral integration is positively associated with an ambidextrous orientation (.45, p < .001), and an ambidextrous orientation is positively associated with subsequent firm performance (.27, p < .01). The latter finding is also illustrated in Figure 1 , which showed that the highest level of performance is achieved when both exploitation and exploration are at their highest levels.
To further explore the patterns of less ambidextrous firms with respect to their pursuit of an exploratory or exploitative orientation, we also performed a post hoc cluster analysis. Following the K-means algorithm (Hartigan & Wong, 1979) , a four-group model provides the best fit. Table 3 shows the exploration and exploitation levels for each of the four cluster centers and reports univariate F-statistics that show the four groups significantly differ on their level of exploratory and exploitative orientations.
As shown in Table 3 , by examining the level of behavioral integration and firm performance of each group of SMEs, we found that Group 1, containing the most ambidextrous firms, had the most behaviorally integrated TMTs and reported the highest levels of subsequent performance, whereas firms at the other extreme, Group 4, had the least integrated TMTs and the lowest performance. Furthermore, whereas ANCOVA showed that behavioral integration (F = 19.30, p < .001) and firm performance (F = 4.09, p < .05) varied significantly across groups, the post hoc S-N-K (Student-Newman-Keuls) procedure indicated that the differences between Group 2 and Group 3 were not statistically significant. In other words, Group 2 and Group 3 firms, which were moderately ambidextrous, but tended to favor either an exploratory or exploitative orientation, had moderate levels of behavioral integration and firm performance, and were both similar to each other, yet significantly different from Groups 1 and 4. These results, therefore, provide additional empirical evidence for the theoretical logic underlying our hypotheses: SMEs with behaviorally integrated TMTs are better able to jointly pursue an exploratory and exploitative orientation and, by doing so, achieve higher levels of relative subsequent performance.
Discussion
Ambidexterity has been explained by organizational structure, context, and learning. Our theory and findings extend the understanding of ambidexterity by being the first to examine the role of TMT behavioral integration. In so doing, we advanced the notion that SMEs are theoretically distinct from larger firms with respect to the knowledge process impediments they face and the role played by TMT members in managing the top-down and bottom-up processes. Our findings, based on multisource data, are, thus, consistent with Hambrick and Finkelstein's (1987) assertion that no other group, including the board of directors, has as great a potential for affecting the form and fate of an organization as the small group of senior executives residing at the apex of the organization. We conclude that upper echelon theory holds promise for serving as a general theory that can complement the previous ambidexterity explanations. However, although our findings give even more credence to the growing importance of TMT behavioral integration as a salient influence on organizational outcomes, our findings also suggest that this influence may be causally indirect. In particular, when we contrast our hypothesized model (Model 4), which separately links behavioral integration to ambidexterity, and ambidexterity to relative firm performance, with a less parsimonious model (Model 5), which adds an additional link between behavioral integration and relative firm performance, we find that Model 4 better fits the data. Although we did not hypothesize a direct casual link between behavioral integration and relative firm performance, taken together, our findings suggest that such an inference would not have been supported. Thus, our findings not only suggest that TMT behavioral integration is essential to achieving an ambidextrous orientation in SMEs; they also suggest that the joint pursuit of an exploratory and exploitative orientation affects performance. Clearly more longitudinal research is needed to further flesh out TMT behavioral integration's causal role.
Our findings also support and extend the study by Simsek and colleagues (2005) . They advanced the theoretical authenticity of behavioral integration, by developing a reliable measure of it and confirming its meta-construct properties. Using the same instrument to measure behavioral integration, and a different sample of firms, we replicated those findings. Whereas they primarily examined the multilevel antecedents of behavioral integration, coming from the CEO, team, firm, and the environment, we demonstrate how behavioral integration facilitates firm-level consequences. A next step might be to test a holistic model that associates behavioral integration with both its antecedents and consequences, for this test might enable researchers to parse out the direct effects of TMT composition.
Of course, it remains an interesting empirical question as to whether our findings generalize to larger firms. Unlike SMEs, outcomes at larger firms are often driven by a broader set of ecological influences extraneous to the TMT, such as multiple product lines and markets, as well as more complex organizational systems, which make their knowledge processes associated with bottom-up and top-down learning more vulnerable to organizational impediments. Moreover, the influence of TMT actions at larger firms may be confounded by external governance pressures from an independent board of directors who can monitor and discipline the TMT irrespective of the CEO's power, as well as by capital markets that monitor firms and provide instantaneous feedback to shareholders via share price.
That said, we would encourage additional research within larger firms. We reason that our SME findings could be replicated at larger firms, given that upper echelon theory has been primarily associated with such firms, and its central thesis holds that the TMT of a firm has the greatest potential to affect its future (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987) . Such findings would also lend further credence to Tushman and O'Reilly's (1997) contention that in a larger firm ambidexterity is driven by the TMT's internal processes. We suspect, however, that the statistical associations between behavioral integration, ambidexterity, and relative firm performance may not be as strong as what we found with our sample of SMEs, primarily because of the many impediments and extraneous influences that will likely dilute the effect size of these associations.
On the other hand, the appropriate level of analysis for studying ambidexterity at large firms may be, as Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) reasoned, at the business unit level and not at the firm level. Specifically, they defined ambidexterity as a capacity to demonstrate alignment and adaptability across an entire business unit, by arguing that "this is potentially a more sustainable model than structural separation because it facilitates the adaptation of an entire business unit, not just the separate units or functions responsible for new business development" (2004: 211). We concur; consider large diversified firms like GE, who keep their eggs in widely different baskets of activities and knowledge (e.g., GE Capital, medical systems, appliances, aerospace, etc.). We reason that the competitive pressures to jointly pursue exploitation and exploration, the knowledge processing demands to attain them, and the role played by the TMT processes are more proximately associated with the business units within a large diversified firm, for there is a limited range of products, technologies, and markets at this level of analysis.
Taken in this light, the SMEs that we studied bear resemblance to business units at large firms in terms of range and, in some cases, number of individuals employed. Thus, although we argued that SMEs are theoretically distinct from larger firms with respect to the knowledge process impediments they face and the role played by TMT members in managing the top-down and bottom-up processes, SMEs may not be as distinct from the large firm's business units. A research question, therefore, is whether behavioral integration's role with the senior management teams of business units is as pivotal as what we found for the TMTs of SMEs. Perhaps size matters, not so much at the firm level but at the business unit level. Perhaps at very large business units, like those at GE, each unit may face the kind of knowledge impediments that have been associated with large firms and, as such, are forced to manage their knowledge processes in the manner described by O' Reilly and Tushman (2004) , that is, by creating structurally separated units within the larger unit, rather than solely through a behaviorally integrated TMT.
As for additional future research, we believe we have developed a reliable and valid measure of a firm's ambidextrous orientation. Our findings demonstrate that an additive measure, modeled as the simple sum of the items associated with both exploitation and exploration, where each item is treated as a separate indicator of a single latent factor, represents the most interpretable measure, and the one that best fits the data. Hence, we encourage researchers to consider using our measure. Along similar lines, we were able to provide objective evidence to partially validate a self-reported measure of SME performance. Recognizing how difficult it is to find objective performance data for privately held SMEs, we consider this is a step in the right direction for those who wish to study this largely overlooked organizational form, which represents a vital component of most nations' economies.
Likewise, although we found that behavioral integration is positively associated with ambidexterity in SMEs, we cannot infer causality because this portion of our study was correlational and did not involve the manipulation of variables. As such, the present research design cannot rule out the possibility of reverse/reciprocal causality, for example, greater ambidexterity might cause greater behavioral integration. The issue of causality can only be resolved using longitudinal designs, where the complex interplay of these variables is examined over time or through the use of experimental or quasi-experimental manipulations.
Furthermore, our reliance on 1-year, time-lagged relative performance data, although clearly superior to cross-sectional data, prevents us from ruling out other extraneous influences that may have intervened during that period of time. For example, we cannot rule out the conventional ecological view that suggests that a firm's ability to successfully adapt (e.g., by being ambidextrously oriented) to environmental forces is destined to be eroded by entropic administrative forces (Barnett & Freeman, 2001 ). Although we argue that a firm's ability to offset such erosion is based, in part, on the extent to which its TMT is behaviorally integrated, we did not examine our sample firm's level of behavioral integration subsequent to our first survey, which could have varied during the intervening year. Hence, even though behavioral integration is likely to be relatively stable in the short run, given its normative base and the continuing membership of most TMT members, we cannot rule out to what extent erosion may have occurred, which may have further explained some of the unexplained variance in firm performance. Only a longitudinal research design can more precisely address the question as to whether higher performance is sustainable in the face of changing competitive challenges, coupled with limited resources and the inherent difficulties in reconciling differing risk preferences, repertoires, and competencies within the same firm. Such a design would also guard against concerns over intervening phenomena during such an extended time period.
In addition, the fact that some of our covariates, such as firm age, that we selected on the basis of previous research on larger firms did not influence subsequent performance suggests that they may be less applicable to SMEs. Although the absence of this association may simply reflect the more restricted range of our sample, this restriction did not alter the influence of other covariates, like firm size on performance. On the other hand, we also note that team size, which was expected to confound the attainment of an ambidextrous orientation, had a marginally positive effect. Here, too, it may be that in SMEs, attaining ambidexterity necessitates some threshold level of team size in order for there to be sufficient explicit and tacit bases of knowledge to debate and process. Moreover, the positive association between family ownership and ambidexterity suggests that attaining ambidexterity in SMEs may actually be enhanced when TMT members are family. Clearly, more needs to be understood about SMEs, including the identification of covariates that are specific to this population. In short, a comprehensive investigation of how TMT processes influence ambidexterity in SMEs and how ambidexterity influences their subsequent performance has been long overdue, and we hope our findings will help pave the way for the next generation of research.
And last, with regard to managerial implications, prior research suggests that firms are more likely to develop a natural tendency to focus on either exploitation or exploration, but not both. Henderson and Clark refer to this tendency as the "competency trap" (1990), Weick as a "key dilemma facing organizations " (1982: 386) , and Levinthal and March as a "basic unresolved problem" (1993: 105) . Our findings suggest a much more optimistic message to senior SME managers: This problem can be resolved-despite their firm's lack of resources or their inability to take advantage of structural mechanisms that promote ambidexterityand the best-in-class SMEs that do so are rewarded for their efforts.
Put simply, organizational ambidexterity may not be as difficult or illusive for firms to achieve as some in the literature believe. What may be required is to have a CEO with the leadership ability to foster greater behavioral integration among the members of his or her TMT. And, CEOs are generally uniquely positioned to do this, given their responsibility for selecting, evaluating, motivating, and coaching the TMT members. Moreover, our findings suggest that senior managers of larger firms in search of greater ambidexterity may want to
